EarnPool — Deposit
Overview
The Trader allocates idle USDC from KPortfolio into an enabled EarnPool to generate yield. This is a manual, discretionary operation — the protocol does not auto-allocate.
Access Control
Only the Trader role may call depositPool().
Flow
sequenceDiagram
actor Tr as Trader
participant Port as KPortfolio
participant Pool as EarnPool
participant Proto as Underlying Protocol (Aave/Morpho/HLP)
Tr->>Port: depositPool(poolAddress, amount)
Port->>Port: Verify pool is enabled
Port->>Pool: deposit(amount)
Pool->>Proto: supply/deposit USDC
Proto-->>Pool: Receipt (aToken / share)
Pool-->>Port: Deposit confirmed
Port-->>Tr: SuccessStep-by-Step
| Step | Actor | Action | Detail |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Trader | Select target pool and amount. | Off-chain decision based on allocation targets (e.g., 80% Aave, 20% Morpho). |
| 2 | Trader | Call deposit. | portfolio.depositPool(poolAddress, amount) |
| 3 | KPortfolio | Validate. | Confirm pool is in the enabled whitelist. Confirm sufficient idle USDC. |
| 4 | KPortfolio | Transfer to pool. | USDC sent to EarnPool adapter via SafeERC20. |
| 5 | EarnPool | Deposit to protocol. | Adapter-specific logic (e.g., Aave pool.supply(), Morpho vault.deposit()). |
Preconditions
| Condition | Enforcement |
|---|---|
| Pool is enabled | Pool must be in activePools whitelist. |
| Sufficient idle USDC in Portfolio | USDC.balanceOf(portfolio) >= amount |
Caller has Trader role |
AccessControl modifier |
| Vault is not paused | whenNotPaused modifier |
Security Considerations
- Trader Cannot Steal: The Trader can only move funds to whitelisted pools — never to arbitrary addresses. This limits the blast radius of a compromised Trader key.
- Over-Allocation: If the Trader deploys all idle USDC, the vault may have insufficient liquidity for user withdrawals, triggering pool withdrawals (with potential slippage) during redemptions.