Security Notes
This section documents the architectural security measures implemented within King's Vault V2.
| Area | Note |
|---|---|
| Upgradeability | The Controller and HyperCoreAllocator utilize the UUPS upgradeable pattern and manage internal layout via ERC-7201 namespaced storage, preventing storage collision risks during future upgrades. |
| Reentrancy | All outward-facing capital movements, including Vault withdrawal, async claim, and emergency redemption paths, enforce strict nonReentrant modifiers to protect against reentrancy attacks. |
| Emergency Design | The shutdown() function acts as a permanent kill switch for the vault. Once triggered, normal deposit/withdraw flows are permanently disabled, switching the vault to an emergency redemption-only mode. |
| Strategy Failure Isolation | The liquidity waterfall mechanism catches failed replenish() calls to external strategies and smoothly retries with the remaining active strategies, ensuring one broken strategy does not freeze entire vault withdrawals. |
| Cross-chain State | To prevent spoofing, HyperStrategy only processes state updates matching the expected CCTP source domain and the registered HyperCoreAllocator sender. |
| Fee Minting | Performance fee shares dilute existing vault holders and are deliberately designed to only be minted after an Admin explicitly confirms a profitable NAV epoch, preventing automated exploits or Keeper manipulation. |
| Harvest Protection | The native vault asset and vault share tokens are strictly protected from harvest sweeps while the vault is active, and remain locked for 7 days post-shutdown to ensure fair distribution before dust sweeping is permitted. |