What the Contracts Cannot Do
A depositor's protection comes less from what a system's operators promise than from what its contracts make impossible. The statements below are true for the deployed V2 contracts regardless of which addresses hold which roles. Each names the code that enforces it. Anything not on this list should be assumed to be possible for some role; see the permission matrix.
Status as of 2026-09-27, against kingsvault-v2 main (6add944).
Vault (KingsVaultV2, KingsVaultV2Async)
| Cannot |
Enforced by |
| Change its own code. |
Vault contracts are plain (non-proxy) deployments; there is no upgrade function. |
| Accept a deposit or pay a withdrawal for an address outside the allowlist. |
_deposit / _withdraw are onlyRole(Roles.INVESTOR); maxDeposit / maxWithdraw return 0 for other addresses. |
| Accept deposits or pay withdrawals while paused or after shutdown. |
whenNotPaused / whenNotShutdown on the same paths. |
| Mint shares at a price better for the depositor than the more conservative of the live and confirmed valuations, or pay a redemption at a price better for the redeemer than the more conservative of the two. |
_convertToShares / _convertToAssets dual-pricing (see Architecture Overview). |
| Mint performance-fee shares on its own. |
mintFeeSharesOnlyForController requires msg.sender == CONTROLLER; the Controller calls it only inside confirmValues and only when the confirmed epoch shows a profit and feeRate > 0. |
Pay a withdrawal below MIN_WITHDRAW (1 USDC). |
WithdrawTooLow check in _withdraw. |
| Reverse a shutdown. |
shutdown() sets a one-way flag; there is no un-shutdown function. |
| Be unpaused or shut down by anyone but a Guardian. |
pause / unpause / shutdown are onlyRole(Roles.GUARDIAN). |
Controller
| Cannot |
Enforced by |
| Set a performance fee of 100% or more. |
setFeeRate reverts with InvalidFeeRate when feeRate_ >= 1_000_000. |
| Apply a fee rate change to an epoch already proposed. |
The rate is snapshotted at proposeValues; confirmValues uses the snapshot. |
| Confirm a NAV proposal older than one hour. |
MAX_PROPOSAL_AGE = 1 hours; confirmValues reverts with ProposalStale. |
| Let a single role both propose and confirm a NAV epoch. |
proposeValues is onlyRole(KEEPER); confirmValues is onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE). A key holding both roles could, which is why key holders matters. |
| Route a vault's funds to a strategy that was not registered for that vault. |
fundInvest / fundDivest check the strategy is in the vault's registry (strategyAdd, Developer role). |
Register a strategy whose asset() or receiver() does not match the vault. |
Compatibility checks in strategyAdd (AssetMismatch, ReceiverMismatch). |
| Deliver a strategy's divested or replenished assets anywhere but the vault it belongs to. |
Each strategy's RECEIVER is an immutable set at deployment to its vault; divest / replenish / exit transfer to RECEIVER. |
Strategies
| Cannot |
Enforced by |
| Change which external protocol or vault they target. |
Target addresses (ERC4626_VAULT, POOL, GSM, DEX, RESOLVER, CCTP messenger, allocator) are immutables. |
| Change which King's Vault they deliver assets to. |
RECEIVER immutable. |
| Be called by anyone but a Keeper-role holder. |
invest / divest / replenish / exit are onlyRole(Roles.KEEPER); so is harvest, except in GhoSavingFluidStrategy where harvest and setSlippage are Admin-only (DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE). |
Sweep the strategy's own position token through harvest. |
harvest reverts with InvalidHarvestToken for the ERC-4626 share (ERC4626_VAULT) in the Steakhouse and legacy GHO Saving strategies, for the aToken in AaveV3Strategy, and for USDC itself in HyperStrategy. Exception: GhoSavingFluidStrategy.harvest (Admin-only) can move its sGHO shares to the vault, by design, so the position can be relocated without a forced GHO sale during a depeg. |
Cross-chain (HyperStrategy, HyperCoreAllocator)
| Cannot |
Enforced by |
| Accept a state message from any sender other than the registered counterpart on the expected CCTP domain. |
Source-domain and sender checks in handleReceiveFinalizedMessage. |
| Have a CCTP message completed by an arbitrary relayer. |
Outbound messages set destinationCaller to the receiving contract; completion is only through the contract's own Keeper-gated entry points. |
| Start a second cross-chain invest while one is in flight. |
OperationInProgress guard on HyperStrategy.invest. |
What this page does not claim
- It does not claim the contracts are free of bugs; see Security for audit status.
- It does not claim that a role holder will act; see Exit paths for what depends on the Keeper and Guardian.
- It does not cover the separate V3 GHO Staking contracts.